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LAWYER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CLIENTS: OUTRIGHT REJECTION-NO; 
LIMITATIONS ON ISSUES AND 
ARGUMENTS-YES 
SAMUEL STONEFIELD* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION AND A PROPOSED ANSWER 
A. The Question 
In a society that prohibits most public discrimination, l should a 
lawyer be able to discriminate in the selection or treatment of a 
client or prospective client?2 To be more specific, should the con-
duct of the following six attorneys who specialize in family law and 
discriminate in the selection or treatment of clients be lawful or 
unlawful? 
• Lawyer 1 is a white male lawyer who refuses to represent Afri-
can-Americans in his family law practice because he strongly 
dislikes them and does not want to associate with any African-
Americans. He states that his "strong personal feelings" would 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. A.B.,1967, 
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1971, Harvard University; Commissioner, Massachusetts 
Commission Against Discrimination, 1977-1981. I would like to thank and to commend 
my colleagues and our law review for their commitment to producing this symposium 
and the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination for continuing to fight the 
good fight. 
1. I use the adjective "public" with discrimination to refer to acts of discrimina-
tion both by public entities and by private entities (employers, landlords, banks, doc-
tors, accountants and lawyers) acting in the "public sphere." See generally MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
Our legal and social culture generally recognizes a sphere of private autonomy and 
permits discrimination within that private sphere, such as in the choice of one's friends. 
While the line between the public and private spheres is socially constructed, contingent 
and not always clear, the conduct of lawyers in the practice of law is unquestionably in 
the public sphere. 
2. The term "discriminate" in this article means "to treat differently" because of 
race, sex, national origin, religion, disability, sexual preference and any other character-
istics deemed unlawful by the state's civil rights laws. I am referring only to the dispa-
rate treatment theory of discrimination, "the most easily understood type of 
discrinlination." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 
n.15 (1977). 
103 
104 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:103 
compromise his ability to provide zealous representation of a 
black client;3 
• Lawyer 2 is a white male lawyer who similarly dislikes African-
Americans and refuses them as clients. However, his discrimi-
nation is covert, not overt; he always gives a plausible, albeit 
pretextual, reason for his denial (too busy to accept a new case 
right now; might have a conflict; etc.); 
• Lawyer 3 is a female attorney with what she calls a feminist 
family law practice. While most of her clients are women, she 
also represents men. However, in an initial interview prior to 
forming a client relationship, she tells any male prospective cli-
ent that, with respect to certain issues and arguments involving 
financial obligations, she may treat him differently than she 
would a female client, because of her interpretation of the law, 
in the following manner. 
A recurrent issue in family law practice is the determination of 
the payments to be made by the wage-earner spouse to the 
homemaker spouse, as a form of deferred compensation for 
unpaid domestic labor, chiIdrearing and diverse other services 
provided to support the wage-earner and his or her career.4 
Most of the time, the wage-earner spouse is a man and the 
homemakerspouse is a woman, and most of the time Lawyer 3 
represents the female homemaker. Sometimes, however, the 
roles are reversed and the homemaker is a male. In Lawyer 3's 
opinion, while a male and female homemaker may often be 
alike in certain respects,5 social and economic forces also make 
3. For a similar hypothetical, see Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers License 
to Discriminate in New York: The Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETI-liCS 275, 276 (1993), and Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohib-
iting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal Profession'S Response to Discrimination on 
the Rise, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 5, 11 (1993). I strongly recommend 
Professor Begg's article as a thorough and scholarly introduction to the many issues 
raised by lawyer discrimination. 
4. The divorce of business executive Gary Wendt and homemaker Lorna Wendt 
provides a recent high-profile example of this type of dispute. The case went to trial 
when Ms. Wendt rejected her husband's $8 million pre-trial offer of settlement. In a 
preliminary decision on December 3, 1997, the trial judge awarded Ms. Wendt an esti-
mated $20 million. See Betsy Morris, It's Her Job Too: Lorna Wendt's $20 Million Di-
vorce Case Is the Shot Heard 'Round the Water Cooler, FORTUNE, Feb. 2, 1998, at 64. 
For a good discussion of this issue, see Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Phys-
ics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93 (1997). 
5. The actual allocation of domestic work and responsibilities between the wage-
earner and the homemaker will be specific to each marriage. Lawyer 3 does not assume 
that a male homemaker will have occupied the same domestic role and performed the 
same work as a female homemaker. She believes in the accuracy of studies reporting 
that, in households where both spouses are full-time wage-earners (and thus are "simi-
larly situated" in this formal sense), the female spouse still does most of the domestic 
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them unlike in other ways. Factors as diverse as the sex role 
development in childrearing, allocation of roles and tasks in 
the family, opportunities and expectations in schools, and dis-
crimination and opportunities in the workplace have made the 
world different for men and women. Lawyer 3 believes that it 
is essential that courts recognize these differences and grant 
female homemakers a "plus factor" not available to male 
homemakers. Lawyer 3 will not make a "plus factor" argu-
ment on behalf of men and will not oppose it if made on behalf 
of a woman (although she may contest its implications in the 
context of a specific case). Thus, if a househusband such as 
Mr. Stropnicky comes to her, Lawyer 3 tells him that the argu-
ments that she will make for him as a male homemaker may be 
similar in some respects to, but also different in some respects 
from, the arguments that she would for a female homemaker.6 
She thus offers Mr. Stropnicky what she calls "conditional rep-
resentation," an offer to represent him conditional upon his 
understanding and acceptance of the particular terms of repre-
sentation. If the male prospective client agrees to representa-
tion on this basis (and affirms that agreement in writing), 
Lawyer 3 will represent him. 
• Lawyer 4 is a white male lawyer who is willing to represent, 
and has represented, both white and Mrican-American clients 
in most family law transactions but not in the context of the 
drafting, review or litigation of a prenuptial agreement for a 
person of one race marrying a person of another race. While 
he will draft and review (and defend or enforce in court) a 
prenuptial agreement for a black person marrying a black per-
son or for a white person marrying a white person, he feels 
strongly that inter-racial marriages are morally wrong and so-
cially harmful and will not draft or review (or defend or en-
force in court) a prenuptial agreement in these circumstances; 
• Lawyer 5 is Judith Nathanson, the respondent in Stropnicky v. 
105 
work. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: 
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989). Lawyer 3 interpolates 
from these studies that a male homemaker is likely to do less domestic and childrearing 
work than a female homemaker. Also, given the non-traditional nature of the male 
homemaker role, Lawyer 3 also believes that, in general, male homemakers move back 
and forth between homemaker and wage-earner roles more often than female home-
makers do. 
6. The lawyer also tells him that she will not assume that he, as a male home-
maker, has occupied the same domestic role and performed the same work as has a 
female homemaker in the "traditional" family. See supra note 5 and the accompanying 
text. She will conduct a detailed intake interview to ascertain the facts in each particu-
lar case. 
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Nathanson.7 Attorney Nathanson represents only women, and 
not men, in her family law practice.s Her reasons for wanting 
to represent women and not men involve a desire "to devote 
her expertise to eliminating gender bias in the court system,"9 
to specialize in "the issues that arise in representing wives in 
divorce proceedings,"lO and "to feel a personal commitment to 
her client's cause ... that in family law she has only exper-
ienced ... in representing women."l1 
• Lawyer 6 is a white male attorney who repres·ents only men in 
family matters and has acquired particularized expertise in ad-
vance planning to remove assets from the reach of possible di-
vorce court decrees. He believes that limiting his practice to 
men-and letting his clients and prospective clients know of 
this limitation-is essential in creating and maintaining his cli-
ents' confidence in him and his work, and that having their to-
tal confidence is essential to his specialized asset-protection 
counseling. Further, as a matter of personal and political con-
viction, Lawyer 6 believes that those who work in the labor 
and capital markets to create income and wealth should be en-
titled to keep the fruits of their labor and that any problems 
concerning the economic status of women after divorce should 
be resolved either by prior contractual agreements of the par-
ties, the individual efforts of the divorced female spouse or by 
social relief programs funded by all taxpayers, and not by fam-
ily court orders, which he views as forced contributions from 
the former male spouse. 
From a broad perspective, the decision to permit or prohibit 
lawyer discrimination is. yet another example of interest balancing 
in the regulatory context. In general, our society has strongly em-
braced the antidiscrimination principle and its core idea that mak-
ing decisions about other people on the basis of their race and sex is 
presumptively wrong.12 However, other goals, such as autonomy, 
privacy or efficiency, sometimes trump the policy of nondiscrimina-
7. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). This essay assumes 
the reader's basic familiarity with this decision. 
8. She represents both men and women "in other legal proceedings, not involving 
controversies between men and women .... " Id. at 40. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. The extensive literature on the antidiscrinlination principle begins with the 
seminal articles by Owen Fiss and Paul Brest. See Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 
Term~Foreword; In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1976); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 
(1971). . 
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tion and then, through exemptions, exceptions and, affirmative de-
fenses, statutes permit discrimination.13 A decision in the lawyer 
context will balance the importance of prohibiting lawyer discrimi-
nation against the importance of preserving the freedom to discrim-
inate as an essential part of the practice of law. A decision-maker 
that engages the issue will have to assess the practical and symbolic 
consequences of the decision and then decide to permit, to prohibit 
or to permit some and to prohibit other lawyer discrimination. 
As a matter of both law and policy, the legal status of lawyer 
discrimination is presently open for discussion as never before. The 
longstanding traditional view permits all lawyer discrimination as a 
necessary consequence of broad lawyer discretion to select or reject 
clients.14 This view somehow survived the civil rights and regula-
tory revolution of the 1960's and 1970's and has reigned largely un-
challenged and virtually unnoticed. However, recent rules, and 
rulings prohibiting lawyer discrimination-from sources as diverse 
as state bar regulation, federal legislation, and a new application of 
traditional state statutes-threaten the dominance of the traditional 
view. The State of California, with more lawyers than any other 
state in the nation,IS now prohibits lawyers from discriminating 
against clients.16 The 1990 Am~ricans with Disability Act specifi-
13. In recognition of the autonomy' interest of the small entity and the increased 
enforcement costs of monitoring their conduct, statutes routinely exempt small employ-
ers or landlords from coverage. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994) (federal employ-
ment discrimination laws applicable to employers with 15 or more employees only); 42 
U.S.c. § 3603(c)(3) '(1994) (Federal Fair Housing Act applicable to owners of any 
dwelling designed or intended for occupancy by five or more families). Religious em-
ployers and Indian tribes are also exempt in certaIn instances. See 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e(b). While there are no authoritative studies, given the large number of small 
. employers and small hindlords, the exemptions permit discrimination in a considerable 
proportion of the labor and housing markets. 
14. See discussion Part III.A.2. 
15. Barbara A. Curran & Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The 
U.S. Legal Profession in the 199Os, 1994 AM. BAR. FOUND. 45. Based on a 1991 survey, 
the authors reported 105,253 lawyers in California in 1991. See id. at 45. 
16. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 2-400 (effective Mar. 1, 
1994). The Rule prohibits unlawful discrimination in employment or in "accepting or 
terminating any client," id. Rule 2-400(B)(I)-(2), and states that unlawful discrimina-
tion "shall be determined by reference to applicable state. or federal statutes or deci-
sions making unlawful discrimination in ... offering goods and services to the public," 
id. Rule 2-400(A)(3). An enforcement provision states that "[n]o disciplinary investiga-
tion or proceeding may be initiated by the State Bar against a member under this rule 
unless and until a tribunal of competent jurisdiction, other than a disciplinary tribunal, 
shall have first adjudicated a complaint of alleged discrimination and found that unlaw-
ful conduct occurred." Id. Rule 2-400(C). There are as of yet no decisions, rulings or 
advisory opinions interpreting this Rule. Telephone interview with Lynn Cobb, Parale-
gal, State Bar of California (Feb. 24, 1998). 
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cally identifies the "office of ... [a] lawyer" as a place where disa-
bility discrimination is prohibited,17 And the Stropnicky 18 decision 
that led to this symposium ruled that a state public accommodation 
law, enacted in 1865, prohibits all lawyer discrimination.19 The is-
sue is ready for reconsideration. 
B. A Proposed Answer: A Summary of the Argument 
This essay offers an approach to lawyer discrimination that falls 
between the total permission of the traditional view and the total 
prohibition of the recent enactments and interpretations. Borrow-
ing from the approach used in employment discrimination law, I 
propose the prohibition of lawyer discrimination, subject to two 
narrow affirmative defenses. The general prohibition represents so-
ciety's strong opposition to discrimination and applies to lawyers 
the same rule that currently applies to doctors, psychiatrists, ac-
countants and virtually all other professions and occupations-the 
rule of nondiscrimination. The two affirmative defenses recognize 
that exceptional circumstances may justify otherwise-unlawful dis-
crimination. One such defense, analogous to the BFOQ defense in 
employment law,2° is based on professional standards and permits 
In recent years, several jurisdictions have considered and enacted antidiscrimina-
tion rules governing employment practices and the treatment of witnesses, court per-
sonnel and attorneys. See Begg, supra note 3, at 303-18 (discussing proposed rules and 
rules in Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington). However, I have found no other juris-
diction whose code of professional responsibility explicitly prohibits lawyer discrimina-
tion against clients. 
17. 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F) (1994); see also James G. Frierson, Does Your Law 
Office Meet the Requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 32 LAW OFF. 
ECON. & MGMT. 397 (1991). 
18. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MCAD Feb. 25, 1997). 
19. Section 98 of Chapter 272 of the Massachusetts General Laws was enacted on 
May 16, 1865, and amended on numerous occasions thereafter. Its text does not pro-
vide any affirmative defenses, and the Single Commissioner's decision in Stropnicky did 
not recognize any. 
20. BFOQ is the acronym for "bona fide occupational qualification," a defense 
recognized in Title VII, ADEA, and the ADA. Title VII reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [title], (1) it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on 
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise .... 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e) (1994); see also 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) (1994) (BFOQ also serves 
as a defense in the ADEA when the use of age is "reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business"); 42 U.S.c. § 12113(a) (1994) (it may be a defense 
to a charge of discrimination under the ADA that "an alleged application of qualifica-
1998] DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CLIENTS 109 
discrimination if the attorney can prove that such discrimination is 
necessary to the practice of law. The other affirmative defense per-
mits discrimination if the lawyer proves that the prohibition violates 
a constitutional right of either the lawyer or the client, such as the 
right of free speech, the right of association or the right to avoid 
being compelled to say what one does not want to say. Under my 
proposal, a lawyer wishing to discriminate must present a written 
request for the recognition of an affirmative defense, in advance of 
any discrimination, to the state entity that regulates lawyers and 
must obtain prior approval for any discrimination.21 
Section II sets forth my proposal and the reasons that support 
it, and Sections III and IV interpret the proposal and apply it to the 
conduct of the six attorneys in the introductory examples. In care-
fully applying the antidiscrimination principle to the practice of law 
and the interaction between lawyers and clients, these sections pro-
duce an interesting finding: not all lawyer discrimination is alike. 
As is common with employment, housing and other forms of dis-
crimination, there are two distinct types of possible lawyer discrimi-
nation: outright client rejection on the one hand, and limits in the 
selection of particular issues and arguments, on the other.22 The 
discrimination of Lawyers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 exemplifies outright client 
rejection. The discrimination of Lawyer 3 represents the discrimi-
natory limitation of issues and arguments.23 Distinguishing be-
tween these two types of lawyer discrimination is useful in thinking 
about the discrimination that might be justified and the discrimina-
tion that cannot. 
tion standards ... that screen out ... or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual 
with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity"). 
The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the BFOQ exception, see Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977), to permit discrimination only in limited situations, 
see International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991). 
21. The requirement for a prior written ruling will encourage reflection and dis-
cussion about the decision to discriminate, from which might come greater understand-
ing of both the reasons for the prohibition and the reasons for the discrimination and, 
over time, better mechanisms to accommodate the tensions between the prohibition 
and the lawyer's practice. Written rulings will also provide guidance to other lawyers 
and will develop both the boundaries between permissible and impermissible discrimi-
nation and an understanding of the values that shape those boundaries. 
22. These two types of discrimination are analogous to "failure to hire" and 
"terms and conditions" discrimination in employment discrimination cases, 42 U.S.c. 
§ 2000e, and "failure to rent" and "terms and conditions" discrimination in housing 
discrimination cases, 42 U.S.c. § 3604(b) (1994). 
23. It is classic disparate treatment because the lawyer treats a male client differ-
ently than she would treat a female client. 
110 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:103 
As developed more fully in Section III, I conclude that none of 
the many plausible conceptions of the practice of law, the lawyer's 
role and the client's rights can justify discrimination in the outright 
rejection of clients, and that prohibiting such discrimination does 
not violate a lawyer's (or client's) constitutional rights. On the 
other hand, I find that both affirmative defenses play an important 
role in justifying the second type of discrimination in certain cases. 
Both constitutional law and professional standards governing the 
practice of law support a lawyer's qualified right not to make partic-
ular arguments on behalf of a client of a particular race or sex that 
he or she would make on behalf of a client of another race or sex. 
In Section IV, I describe how these professional standards can jus-
tify the actions of Lawyer 3 but not the conduct of the other five 
lawyers.24 
I want to make two final introductory points before proceeding 
with the substantive discussion. First, I want to acknowledge the 
difficulty of the issues and my own uncertainty with my proposed 
solution. The question of when, if ever, to permit lawyer discrimi-
nation is difficult and surprisingly slippery. It involves basic and 
deeply contested issues concerning the lawyer's role, the nature of 
the practice of law and the' nature of a profession. It requires as-
sessments of both lawyer-centered and client-centered views of 
legal practice and the implications and limitations of those views. I 
am far from certain that my proposals are correct as a matter of 
either law or policy; I have changed my views more than once in the 
preparation of this essay and will surely be forced to think hard 
about changing them again. It will take time and experience to 
build a shared vocabulary in this area and to develop some confi-
dence in our individual and social jl!dgments. Given this difficulty 
and uncertainty, we should favor approaches that foster dialogue 
and discussion and that encourage us to understand better and to 
accommodate inore effectively the tensions between the prohibition 
against discrimination and evolving professional standards and con-
stitutional rights. 
24. I also explore how it may be possible to recast Judith Nathanson's claiin and· 
view her as similar to LaWyer 3. While not how she presented herself or her claim and 
thus not the basis on which the· Single Commissioner adjudicated the case, Lawyer 3's 
claim seems to capture the core of Nathanson's concerns. In Section V, I suggest that 
the Full Commission of the MCAD should incorporate my two proposed affirmative 
defenses into the statute and then remand the case to the Single Commissioner to hold 
further hearings and to determine whether Ms. Nathanson satisfied the requirements of 
either or both of the affirmative defenses. 
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Secondly, I want to explain the format used in the following 
sections. The essay elaborates the approach summarized in this in-
troduction by presenting a suggested legislative resolution and then 
interpreting and applying that legislation. To assist in the explica-
tion, I use the device of a hypotheticallegislature,zs one that heard 
about the Stropnicky case, studied the issue of lawyer discrimina-
tion and then enacted legislation prohibiting such discrimination, 
subject to the two affirmative defenses. For me at least, the legisla-
tive setting provides a policy-oriented perspective broader than the 
one available when responding to issues raised by a particular case 
or interpreting state or federal law or codes of professional respon-
sibility. Further, locating the policy discussion and decision in a 
legislature highlights several institutional features of lawyer dis-
crimination that are easily overlooked: that the legal profession and 
the judiciary are not the only sources of professional standards for 
the profession;26 that a legislature may very well act to impose stan-
dards if it determines that the legal profession's own standards are 
distinctly out-of-touch with broad social norms; and that a legisla-
ture will be skeptical of arguments based on what I will call "lawyer 
exceptionalism," claims that the practice of law is so "special" that 
the standards that apply to other occupations and professions 
should not apply to lawyers. 
25. This legislature is of course the creation of the author, a fifty-two year old 
white male law professor who was, from 1977 to 1981, a Commissioner of the MCAD, 
the agency whose Stropnicky decision inspired this symposium. I project onto this hy-
pothetical legislature my views on how a conscientious legislature ought to approach 
and to resolve these issues. I make no claim to descriptive accuracy; it is simply a heu-
ristic device. 
26. In this country, the judiciary is the primary regulator of lawyers, based both 
on historical practice and the separation of powers grounds that the regulation of the 
practice of law is part of the judicial function. This separation of powers perspective 
supports what is known as the "negative inherent powers" doctrine, a radical form of 
which holds that "any attempt by either the legislative or executive branch to entrench 
on that exclusively judicial power is an unconstitutional usurpation." CHARLEs W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 27 (1986). The doctrine is susceptible to serious 
criticism and, even in jurisdictions that accept the doctrine, it is not absolute. See id. at 
28-31. This essay assumes, without further discussion, that no state Supreme Court 
would apply the doctrine to invalidate a state statute that prohibits lawyer discrimina-
tion, especially not a statute that recognizes two affirmative defenses, one of which is 
tied to professional standards as determined by the committee that regulates lawyers. 
In any event, the legislative device in this essay is simply a method for presenting the 
discussion. My underlying approach would work as well as an amendment to the Disci-
plinary Rules promulgated by the highest court of any jurisdiction. 
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II. THE LEGISLATION 
This section will describe the legislature's deliberative process 
and will then present a statute that reflects the legislature's resolu-
tion of the issues. Sections III and IV then interpret and apply the 
statute. As part of the legislative process, our hypotheticallegisla-
ture received a briefing on the Stropnicky decision and held hear-
ings on the issue of lawyer discrimination. It thus acquired a 
considerable amount of background information on matters such as 
the professional standards of the legal profession and other profes-
sions governing discrimination against clients, the existing federal 
laws governing such discrimination, and the social facts concerning 
nature and extent of such discrimination. The legislators were sur-
prised to learn that, even though no other profession permits dis-
crimination against clients and federal law likely prohibits at least 
some forms, the professional standards of the legal profession not 
only do not explicitly prohibit lawyers from discriminating against 
clients but actually permit such discrimination,27 The legislators 
learned that the legal profession is alone in its policy of permitting 
discrimination and that the professional standards governing doc-
tors and psychiatrists (and most other professions and occupations) 
explicitly prohibit discrimination.28 The briefing also informed th,e 
27. This freedom to discriminate is one small part of what Professor Wolfram 
calls the "Orthodoxy of Professional Freedom to Choose Clients." Id. at 573. In exer-
cising this general freedom, "a lawyer may refuse to represent a client for any reason at 
all-because the client cannot pay the lawyer's demanded fee; because the client is not 
of the lawyer's race or socioeconomic status; because the client is weird or not, tall or 
short, thin or fat, moral or immoral." Id. Professor Chin further elaborates and de-
fends this traditional view of the lawyer's freedom to discriminate. See Gabriel J. Chin, 
Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 9 
(1998). 
28. See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, ETHICS MANUAL, reprinted in 
CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 239, 241 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994) 
("Confidentiality respects the privacy of patients, ... and prevents discrimination based 
on their medical condition."); AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF ETH-
ICS AND CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, supra, at 219, 219 ("[D]entists shall not refuse to accept patients into 
their practice or deny dental service to patients because of the patient's race, creed, 
color, sex, or national origin."); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF MEDI-
CAL ETIllCS AND CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS, reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 265, 327 
("[P]hysicians who offer their services to the public may not decline to accept patients 
because of race, color, religion, national origin, or any other basis that would constitute 
invidious discrimination."); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY, re-
printed in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 349, 354 ("A physician 
shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to 
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legislators of two federal statutes-the 1990 Americans with Disa-
bility Act29 and a section of the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights 
Act, amended in 199130-that probably make disability or race dis-
crimination by lawyers unlawful.31 
The legislators were even more surprised by the traditional ra-
tionale for permitting attorney discrimination. As reported to 
them, the legal profession permits such discrimination because of 
the risk that strong personal feelings might prevent the lawyer from 
complying with his or her duties of loyalty to and zealous represen-
tation of the client. This rationale astonished the legislators, who 
thought that a primary reason for professional standards, in any 
profession, was to guide and even to force otherwise unacceptable 
personal behavior into conformity with professional norms. They 
were startled to find the legal profession following the reverse pol-
icy and bending professional norms to accommodate unacceptable 
personal behavior. The legislature found the rationale for the tradi-
tional rule-even when burnished by Professor Chin's spirited de-
fense and elaboration32-wholly unconvincing. 
The legislative briefing contained two other features: a report 
on the extent and severity of the problem of discrimination by law-
yers and a discussion of possible justifications for what might be 
choose whom to serve .... "); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL 
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDuer, reprinted in CODES OF PRo· 
FESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY, supra, at 359, 364 ("[P]sychologists do not engage in unfair 
discrimination based on age, gender, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual 
orientation, disability, socioeconomic status, or any basis proscribed by law."). 
29. 42 V.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
30. 42 V.S.c. § 1981 (1994). 
31. With respect to disability discrimination, the ADA forbids disability discrimi-
nation in, among other situations, a place of public accommodation and defines an of-
fice as a place of public accommodation. See 42 V.S.c. § 12181(7)(F). Although there 
are as yet no reported cases, it seems quite clear that the ADA would apply to discrimi-
nation by a lawyer based on a prospective client's disability. See Frierson, supra note 
17, at 402. The statute clearly applies to discrimination in the provision of medical 
services. See Jairath v. Dyer, 972 F. Supp. 1461 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (doctor);- A.R. v. Ko-
gan, 964 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (doctor); Abbot v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. 
Me. 1995) (dentist). 
With respect to racial discrimination, while I agree with Professor Chin that no 
cases have yet applied § 1981 to the attorney-client contractual relationship, I draw no 
interpretive message from that fact. It seems to me that a statute that gives "all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the Vnited States ... the same right ... to make and enforce 
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens," 42 V.S.c. § 1981(a), would give a black 
prospective client the same right to make and enforce a lawyer-client contract as a 
white person, see Begg, supra note 3, at 329-35 (discussing application of § 1981 to 
lawyer-client contracts). 
32. See Chin, supra note 27. 
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called "affirmative" forms of discrimination, as practiced by Judith 
Nathanson and other lawyers. Reviewing a number of recent stud-
ies on discrimination in the legal profession,33 the staff reported 
that the problem of lawyer discrimination against clients was not 
particularly widespread or severe. The studies discussed many 
types of discrimination and especially noted barriers to the entry of 
minorities and women into the professions and the treatment of mi-
nority and women once they have entered the profession. While 
documenting these problems and suggesting several solutions, it is 
noteworthy that these reports did not even mention, let alone dis-
cussed, the problem of discriminatory refusal to accept clients. The 
staff offered the informal, anecdotal opinion that most lawyers do 
not discriminate but instead offer their professional services to all 
paying clients and that money-not discrimination-is the barrier 
preventing some minorities, women or other protected classes from 
obtaining needed legal services. 
On the other hand, the report also noted anecdotal and histori-
cal evidence of discrimination. Anecdotally, the staff had received 
reports of blatant discrimination, such as lawyers who will not rep-
resent African-Americans because of racial animus or homosexual 
men or women because of homophobia. It has read of the refusal 
of doctors, dentists and lawyers to serve people infected with the 
HIV virus34 and knows that Congress found disability discrimina-
tion by businesses and professionals (including lawyers and doctors) 
33. Numerous recent commissions and committees have studied discrimination 
(primarily racial and sexual) in the legal profession. The subsequent reports have fo-
cused on either access to the p!,"ofession (through law school admissions and law firm 
hiring) or discrimination against witnesses and adverse parties in litigation and negotia-
tion methods and tactics. See, e.g., Albert H. Cantril, Agenda for Access: The American 
People and Civil Justice, Final Report on the Implications of the Comprehensive Legal 
Needs Study, 1996 AB.A CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. AND THE PUB.; CIVIL JUS· 
TICE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 1990s, PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NA· 
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN THE 1990s (Esther F. Lardent ed., 
AB.A 1989); Barbara A Curran, Women in the Law: A Look at the Numbers, in 1995 
A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION; CYNTHIA FUCHS EpSTEIN, WOMEN IN 
LAW (University of Illinois Press 2d ed. 1993) (1981); BERNARD F. LENTZ & DAVID N. 
LABAND, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1995); PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS (Dixie K. Knoebel & 
Marilyn McCoy Roberts eds., National Center for State Courts 1990); LYNN HECHT 
SCHAFRAN, WOMEN'S JUDGES' FUND FOR JUSTICE, PROMOTING GENDER FAIRNESS 
THROUGH JUDICIAL EDUCATION: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES AND RESOURCES (1989); 
Women and the ABA: A History of Women's Bar Association, 1965-1989, 1989 AB.A 
COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION. 
34. See, e.g., Elstein v. State Div. of Human Rights, 555 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 
1990) (preliminary finding of discrimination by a medical doctor who refused to treat 
AIDS patient). See generally Robert T. Begg, Legal Ethics and AIDS: An Analysis of 
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in places of public accommodation prior to enacting the Americans 
with Disabilities AcP5 in 1990. On the historical side, the legisla-
ture is also aware of past patterns of discrimination, including 
WASP law firms refusing to represent Jewish, Irish-American and 
Italo-American clients and of racial and religious discrimination in 
the legal and medical professions. 
After discussing this report, the legislature agreed that any bla-
tant discrimination that does occur is harmful and wrong and 
should be declared unlawful. In addition to the economic losses, 
such discrimination also inflicts a dignitary harm upon the victim 
and an assault on society's commitment to nondiscrimination. Even 
if lawyer discrimination is not widespread, a rule permitting dis-
crimination in the legal profession sends precisely the wrong 
message about both the legal profession and society's views about 
discrimination. The legislature decided to replace the traditional 
rule with a rule explicitly prohibiting discrimination, if only for sym-
bolic reasons. Laws against discrimination require everyone else-
employers, landlords, bankers-to control their personal prefer-
ences when conducting a regulated business. It is not too much to 
require lawyers to obey these same laws.36 
On the other hand, the legislature also thought it appropriate 
to recognize certain narrow affirmative defenses. Just as an em-
ployer is permitted to discriminate if it can prove that such discrimi-
nation is a bona fide occupational qualification, the legislature 
believed that a lawyer (like any other professional) should be per-
mitted to discriminate if he or she could prove that such discrimina-
tion is necessary to the practice of the profession, as determined by 
the professional standards of that profession. In this regard, the 
legislature noted that lawyers in practice often specialize in many 
different ways, including their choice of clients and issues. The leg-
islature did not want to disturb these practices, as it understood 
Selected Issues, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1989); American Bar Association, American 
Bar Association Policy on AIDS, 21 U. ToL. L. REv. 9 (1989). 
35. 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). The ADA explicitly defined professional 
offices as places of public accommodation subject to the statute's prohibition against 
discrimination. See id. § 12181(7)(F). 
36. The legislature also considered and rejected an argument that the prohibition 
would be unworkable, would undermine the lawyer-client relationship, and would lead 
to a flood of frivolous and vexatious claims. These potential problems beset all discrim-
ination laws, indeed all forms of legal regulation. Employers, landlords and other sub-
jects of such regulation have all made the same objections, which society has 
consistently rejected. It is both unpersuasive and unseemly for lawyers to insist that 
enforcement costs and consequences should exempt them, and no one else. 
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them. Some lawyers represent only plaintiffs and others only de-
fendants in personal injury work; some exclusively management 
and others exclusively labor in employment law. Even more to the 
legislature's point, longstanding and important legal advocacy 
groups, such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU, The 
ACLU Women's Rights Project and the NOW Legal Defense Fund 
specialize in representing the interests of certain groups and ideas. 
The legislature's understanding was that these lawyers do not dis-
criminate on the basis of race, sex or any other prohibited charac-
teristic when they decide which clients to accept and to reject.37 
Instead, they base their client-representation decisions on facts and 
issues raised in particular cases and the congruence of those facts 
and issues with their practice, strategy and legal and ideological be-
liefs. The legislature also understood, however, that some of the 
legal defense organizations may at times consider the race or sex of 
a prospective client in determining the types of arguments they 
would be willing to advance on behalf of that client. The legislature 
did not intend its new law to change what it understood to be these 
current practices and expected the affirmative defenses to apply to 
any distinctions and discriminations that they might make in issue 
and argument selection. 
The legislature also decided to recognize an affirmative de-
fense based on constitutional law, permitting the discriminating at-
torney to avoid liability if he or she proves that prohibiting the 
discrimination would violate a constitutional right. The legislative 
report noted that the interpretation of the constitutional issues 
would be closely related to the interpretation of professional stan-
dards governing the practice of law. The legislature included the 
constitutional affirmative defense in the statute to assure that the 
administrative agency charged with the initial fact-finding and inter-
pretation will engage the constitutional issues together with the is-
sues concerning professional standards and the appropriate role of 
lawyers. 
With respect to the affirmative defenses, the legislature created 
an explicit legislative history to document its legislative intent that 
the affirmative defenses were to be narrow and infrequent excep-
tions to the general rule prohibiting discrimination. The legislature 
intended to override the legal profession's traditional rule permit-
37. I describe the nondiscriminatory practices of these groups as the legislature's 
background understanding (whether true or not). I believe the description to be true as 
a matter of social fact but do not presently have documentation for my belief. 
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ting discrimination and to replace it with a general rule prohibiting 
discrimination and did not intend to permit the legal profession's 
traditional rule to reemerge as an affirmative defense. The legisla-
ture intended that the affirmative defense would be used only for 
determining the legality of "affirmative" discrimination. The legis-
lature found that discrimination like Attorney Nathanson's, moti-
vated not by discriminatory animus but by specialized work on 
behalf of a historically-disadvantaged class, raised many difficult is-
sues. The legislature's discussion of "affirmative" discrimination 
echoed the rhetoric of the affirmative action debates, with some 
legislators supporting a rule of sexblindness (and colorblindness) 
and others supporting a flexible, asymmetrical standard that would 
permit exceptions for some actions designed to assist members of 
historically subordinated groups. 
The discussion was unsatisfyingly abstract and the legislature 
was unable to reach agreement. It decided that the issue would be 
more appropriately discussed and resolved in the context of actual 
cases and thus decided to permit the regulatory agency to deter-
mine the circumstances, if any, in which such discrimination could 
be justified. However, the legislature established a strict standard 
to control its delegation. It required the discriminating lawyer to 
persuade the regulatory agency that the discrimination was neces-
sary to the practice of law and, as a way of underlining the standard 
of necessity, to prove that there was no less discriminatory means of 
achieving the same goal. Further, the legislature expressed its in-
tention that the required necessity was to be measured not by the 
idiosyncratic practice of any individual lawyer but against the pro-
fessional standards for the practice of law applicable to the entire 
profession. Finally, the legislature decided to require a lawyer 
wishing to discriminate to present a written request, in advance of 
any discrimination, to the state body that regulates lawyers. The 
prior written request will encourage the individual lawyer to think 
seriously about the reasons for the proposed discrimination and to 
discuss those reasons with a professional body. 
After concluding its deliberations, the legislature prepared a 
statute incorporating its decisions. The substantive portions38 of 
that statute provide: 
38. Any discrimination statute would also have procedural requirements, en-
forcement provisions and a remedies section. While important in any regulatory re-
gime, they are beyond the scope of this essay. 
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Non-Discrimination in Licensed Occupations39 
l(A) It shall be an unlawful practice for the holder of any occu-
pational or professional license issued by the State to prac-
tice or to perform any occupation or profession to 
discriminate in any way against an actual or potential cus-
tomer, client or patient because of that person's race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex or disability; 
(B) Notwithstanding § l(A), it shall not be an unlawful practice 
if the holder of the license demonstrates that it qualifies for 
an affirmative defense, by persuading the agency that is-
sued the license that: 
1) the discrimination is a bona fide occupational or profes-
sional qualification necessary to the normal operation or 
practice of the occupation or profession and that there is 
no less discriminatory way to practice the occupation or 
profession; or 
2) the prohibition of such discrimination would violate the 
constitutional rights of the holder of the license. 
(C) The holder of a license wishing to establish an affirmative 
defense under § l(B) must first apply to the agency that 
issued the license, setting forth with particularity the nature 
of the discrimination in which the holder wishes to engage, 
the affirmative defense(s) it wishes to establish and the rea-
sons that support its claim for the affirmative defense(s). 
III. INTERPRETING THE STATUTE AND ITS .AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES 
This section will interpret the statute and its affirmative de-
fenses. The statute establishes a clear starting point and a directed 
method of analysis. Under the statute, treating a client or prospec-
tive client differently because of a proscribed characteristic is pre-
sumptively unlawful, subject to the affirmative defenses based on 
professional standards or constitutional rights. Each of the six at-
torneys has in fact treated a client or prospective client differently 
because of race or sex. Therefore, under the statute, the conduct of 
all six attorneys is unlawful unless protected by an affirmative 
defense. 
39. Although the impetus for the statute was lawyer discrimination, the statute 
applies to all licensed occupations. By adopting a uniform rule, the legislature sought to 
reaffirm the strong social policy against discrimination and to treat any differences be-
tween the professions and occupations in the context of affirmative defenses to the 
general rule. 
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Before applying the affirmative defenses to the six individual 
cases in Section IV, this section will discuss the general considera-
tions that inform those specific applications, first for the profes-
sional standards and then the constitutional affirmative defenses. 
In determining whether lawyer discrimination is necessary to the 
practice of law or required as a matter of constitutional right, I ex-
amine different perspectives on the practice of law, the role of law-
yers and the rights of clients. I conclude that discrimination in the 
selection and rejection of clients cannot be justified but both profes-
sional standards and constitutional law support the freedom of the 
lawyer to use the race or sex of the client as a factor in interpreting 
the law and deciding which arguments to make on behalf of a client. 
A. Discrimination Justified by Professional Standards 
To establish an affirmative defense based on professional stan-
dards, the lawyer must prove that discrimination based on race or 
sex is necessary to the practice of law. Given that the affirmative 
defenses will be "narrowly construed"40 and that the proponent has 
the burden of persuasion, this affirmative defense will be difficult-
and, for outright client rejection, impossible-to establish. In the 
practice of law, lawyers provide legal services to resolve their cli-
ent's legal problems.41 In doing so, lawyers use the particular 
knowledge, skills and values of the legal profession. The most com-
plete recent inventory of the skills and values of the practicing at-
torney is the Macerate Report.42 That report gives no support to 
the claim that discrimination in client selection in order to have cli-
40. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see also International Union, 
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991) ("Our emphasis on the restric-
tive scope of the BFOQ defense is grounded on both the language and the legislative 
history of § 703."). 
41. Lawyers also serve other functions and provide other services-publicists, 
lobbyists, friends and so on. However, these additional functions are subsidiary to and 
directed toward the core function of providing legal services as defined by the profes-
sional standards of the legal profession. 
42. See Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession, Legal Education and Pro-
fessional Development: An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO BAR (chaired by Robert McCrate). The Report describes "the skills 
and values with which a well-trained generalist should be familiar before assuming ulti-
mate responsibility for a client ... [and which are required] to practice law competently 
and professionally." [d. at 125. The ten skills are problem-solving, legal analysis and 
reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, communication, counseling, negotiation, 
litigation and ADR procedures, organization and management of legal work, and rec-
ognizing and solving ethical dilemmas. See id. at 135. The four values are competent 
representation, promoting justice, fairness and morality, striving to improve the profes-
sion, and professional self-development. See id. at 136. 
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ents of a particular race or sex is in any way necessary to the prac-
tice of law. 
1. Outright Client Rejection 
While rejecting the traditional interpretation,43 the legislature 
specifically left open the question of whether "affirmative" discrim-
ination could be necessary to the practice of law. Attorneys such as 
Judith Nathanson and Lawyer 6 believe that a strong personal rela-
tionship-a bonding and a feeling of attachment and solidarity-
between the lawyer and client is essential to their practice of law, 
and assert that the strong personal relationship is possible only with 
clients of a particular race or sex. They also devote (at least part of) 
their legal practice to a particular cause, such as achieving equal 
rights or economic justice for a particular group, and want to repre-
sent only clients who are members of that group. 
The decision on whether "affirmative" discrimination is neces-
sary to the practice of law of course depends on a conception of 
legal practice and the lawyer's role. None of several common views 
of the lawyer-as a "hired gun," as counselor, as fiduciary and as an 
officer of the court-support the claim that "affirmative" discrimi-
nation is necessary to the practice of law. As a hired gun (or agent 
for the principal, the client), the attorney is selling his or her legal 
expertise in the marketplace, similar to any other tradesperson, and 
the law regularly regulates tradespeople as they sell their services. 
As counselor, the attorney discusses matters with the client and 
gives both legal and non-legal advice.44 However, the fact that 
other professionals (including psychiatrists and social workers) en-
gage in counseling while prohibited from discriminating against cli-
ents undermines the claim that such discrimination is necessary. As 
fiduciary, the lawyer has a special obligation to respect and to pro-
tect the trust and confidences of the client. While that obligation 
surely supports some lawyer discretion in selecting the clients to 
whom he or she will owe that obligation, it does not establish racial 
or sexual discrimination as a necessary element of that discretion. 
Finally, as officer of the court, a thick system of external rules gov-
43. That interpretation permitted discrimination by lawyers due to the risk that 
strong personal feelings might compromise the duties of loyalty to and zealous repre-
sentation of the client. The rejection reflects the view that, in the course of their profes-
sional work, professionals must control their personal feelings and conform their 
professional conduct to proscribed external standards, including nondiscrimination. 
44. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 687-770. 
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ems the lawyer's conduct and speech, and adding a rule prohibiting 
discrimination is not inconsistent with that role. 
Two other perspectives might justify the claim that discrimina-
tion is necessary to the practice of law: the need to respect the au-
tonomy of the individual lawyer, and the need to respect the 
decisions of the client. There are two versions of the lawyer auton-
omy argument, one based on the lawyer's desire for bonding in the 
lawyer-client relationship and the other based on the lawyer's free-
dom to advance social causes. The first version of the lawyer auton-
omy argument derives from the individual lawyer's belief that a 
close attachment with a client is necessary for the effective practice 
of law. If the lawyer further believes that he or she can only 
achieve that close attachment with clients of a certain race or sex, 
then the legal profession should respect that belief and permit the 
discrimination in order to permit the effective practice of law. This 
argument has some resonance, trading as it does on the attractive-
ness and value of positive lawyer-client relationships. Such rela-
tionships are indeed wonderful and deeply satisfying and, often, the 
most instrumentally effective. We instinctively understand both 
their power and their fragility and want to foster and protect those 
relationships. Maximizing lawyer freedom-including the freedom 
to discriminate-is one way to foster (and avoid jeopardizing) those 
relationships. 
While I too value strong lawyer-client relationships, discrimi-
nation is hardly necessary to the achievement of strong bonds, and 
it is unwise to permit discrimination as a means for achieving them. 
Lawyers can and do have satisfying and successful relationships 
across gender, racial, religious and other lines and should be en-
couraged-indeed, required-to develop the skills and commit-
ment necessary to do so. The contrary belief-that discrimination 
is necessary for successful client relationships and that prohibiting 
discrimination would make such relationships impossible-is an-
other example of what I earlier called "lawyer exceptionalism," the 
belief that lawyers are special and require different rules. If psycho-
therapists, bartenders and many others can establish effective pro-
fessional relationships under a regime of nondiscrimination, lawyers 
can too. This "discrimination for bonding" rationale is too similar 
to the "negative personal feelings" rationale for the traditionally 
permitted discrimination. Both rationales are unacceptable for the 
same basic reason: in the practice of a profession, professional stan-
dards (including nondiscrimination) should control contrary con-
duct motivated by personal feelings. 
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A second version of the lawyer autonomy argument is that, in 
the practice of law, lawyers must have the freedom to work on be-
half of particular causes and that their work on behalf of this or that 
cause justifies client discrimination. This argument confuses ends 
and means and eliminates a necessary distinction between personal 
and professional roles. A lawyer of course has the right, both as an 
individual and as a licensed professional, to work on behalf of any 
cause he or she wishes to support, including the advancement of 
women or further economic and social progress for African-Ameri-
cans. But the means that the lawyer uses to pursue those ends must 
be lawful. The lawyer as an individual has wide latitude in deciding 
how to achieve those ends and can choose with whom and for 
whom to work on those activities, using whatever criteria he or she 
wishes to use. In the practice of law and the representation of cli-
ents, however, the lawyer's role is constrained by a number of legal 
requirements and professional standards, and the· prohibition 
against client discrimination is another such requirement. In my 
opinion, using the serve-the-cause rationale to permit discrimina-
tion would be a serious mistake. It would authorize and justify vir-
tually every kind of discrimination, for and against any type of 
racial, ethnic, religious or sexual group. It would be unwise and 
inconsistent with the policy choice reflected in the legislation. As 
shown by the examples of the NAACP and NOW Legal Defense 
Funds and others, it is also unnecessary. 
The other possible justification for lawyer discrimination is cli-
ent-based, grounded in the needs and rights of the client, not the 
autonomy of the lawyer. The client-based argument asserts that 
lawyers must discriminate against some people in order to meet the 
needs of those who want to be represented by an attorney with 
whom the client can "really" identify because 1;Ie or she represents 
"only people like me." Client choice is an important value, but us-
ing it to justify attorney discrimination simply takes it too far. 
As a general matter, clients as private individuals can lawfully 
discriminate. As individuals,45 they can use any reason to select or 
to reject an attorney (or electrician or doctor), including race or 
sex. Female clients can, and often do, select a woman lawyer (or 
electrician or doctor), and the same can be said for males, whites, 
blacks and people of all religious persuasions. No law regulates 
45. While not perfectly clear as a matter of positive law, it is unlikely that a· busi-
ness client has a similar right to discriminate, at least on the basis of disability or race. 
See 42 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994); 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1994). 
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such individual client choice, and any such law would be undesir-
able, unworkable and probably unconstitutional as an infringement 
on personal autonomy. 
The principle of personal autonomy which supports this client 
choice and freedom to discriminate does not, however, support the 
stronger right to select, and to have available for selection, a "pure" 
attorney, one who represents only clients of one race or sex. This 
broader justification for a lawyer's right to discriminate clashes too 
sharply with the principle of nondiscrimination. A recycled version 
of the "customer preference" defense that has been soundly re-
jected in most employment discrimination cases,46. this argument 
sweeps too broadly and depends too strongly on entrenched and 
established patterns of racial and social interaction that the laws 
against discrimination were designed to eliminate.47 . 
The discussion of professional standards thus far has focused 
on claims that lawyer freedom to select clients of a particular race 
or sex is necessary to the practice of law: After examining argu-
ments based on the lawyer's role and on a client's rights, it has con-
cluded that the legislative standard for justifying a discriminatory 
46. See, e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 609 (9th Cir. 
1982) (the airline passengers' preference for female flight attendants cannot establish a 
BFOQ); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (the fact 
that the employer's South American clients would refuse to deal with women officers is 
not a basis for establishing a BFOQ); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 
385,389 (5th Cir. 1971) (the "pleasant environment" and "cosmetic effect" provided by 
female flight attendants was tangential to the airline's primary function); Vigars v. Val-
ley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 808 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (the preference of parents 
whose children attended school did not establish a BFOQ for the school prohibiting 
unwed pregnant employees); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Hasidic clientele's preference for male bus drivers does not establish a 
BFOQ); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (the 
airline passengers' preference for female flight attendants cannot establish a BFOQ; the 
duties of attracting and entertaining male passengers and fulfilling customer expecta-
tions for female service are tangential to the essence of a flight attendant job). 
47. As an example of laws relying on customer preferences to justify sex discrimi-
nation, several states, including Massachusetts, have recently amended their public ac-
commodation statutes to permit health and fitness clubs to discriminate on the basis of 
sex, thus legalizing all-female and all-male health clubs. See 1998 Mass. Legis. Servo ch. 
19 (West); ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-103 (West 1993) ("Nothing in this Article shall 
apply to ... [a]ny facility, as to discrimination based on sex, which is distinctly private in 
nature such as ... health clubs .... "); see also Livingwell (North) Inc. V. Pemlsylvania 
Human Relations Comm'n, 606 A.2d 1287, 1294 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).(sex is a bona 
fide public accommodation qualification for members of a women's health club). Legis-
latures approving these amendments believed that,.in the context of health clubs, pro-
tecting the privacy interests of customers was more important than enforcing the 
prohibition against discrimination. The sharp focus and narrow tailoring of this exemp-
tion has given it an appeal unlikely to exist for clients of legal services. 
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refusal to represent a client has not been met. When the decision-
maker (in this essay, the legislature) rejects the traditional "strong 
personal feelings" as a rationale and requires that discrimination be 
necessary to the practice of law, the remaining arguments in sup-
port of such discrimination also collapse. 
2. Reasonable Limitations on Issues and Arguments 
However, while providing no defense to outright discrimina-
tion, professional standards do justify the lawyer's use of the race or 
sex of a client in deciding the issues and arguments the lawyer is 
willing to raise on behalf of that client. To step outside of the fam-
ily law area, take the example of a lawyer who specializes in repre-
senting plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Assuming an 
appropriate factual basis, professional standards will require the 
lawyer representing· a black or female plaintiff in a Title VII em-
ployment discrimination case to make a claim of disparate impact 
discrimination48 (and would find the lawyer professionally negligent 
if he or she did not make that claim). However, in discussing the 
possible representation of a white or male plaintiff in an employ-
ment case with otherwise-identical facts, that same lawyer should 
be allowed, if he or she desires, to inform the potential client that 
he or she will not make a disparate impact argument on behalf of 
the white or male client. The basis for the refusal to make the argu-
ment is the attorney's reasonable legal opinion that, because the 
disparate impact theory of discrimination is designed to remedy 
past discrimination against historically-subordinated groups, only 
members of such groups can properly assert disparate impact 
claims. This view of the disparate impact claim is a reasonable and 
probably even the correct view, but it is by no means the only rea-
sonable interpretation and is not authoritatively established.49 A 
48. The disparate impact theory of discrimination enables a plaintiff to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination by proving that practices neutral on their face and in 
their motivation have a statistically significant disparate impact on the plaintiff's pro-
tected group. First announced by a unanimous court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971), the theory was codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) as a result of 
Section 105(a) of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. For a general discussion of the disparate 
impact theory, see BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 81-114 (Paul W. Cane, Jr., ed., 3d ed. 
1996). 
49. Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue, language 
in two cases suggests that the disparate impact theory is limited to members of certain 
groups. Even while deciding that one of the purposes of Title VII was to protect the 
employment opportunities of individuals (and thus rejecting the employer's group-ori-
ented bottom-line defense), the Court nevertheless said that the disparate impact the-
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different lawyer could reasonably assert a disparate impact claim on 
behalf of a male or white client. Presenting the claim would cer-
tainly not violate Rule 11, and the claim might even win. The plain-
tiff-oriented attorney's legal interpretation is reasonable and legally 
justified but by no means legally compelled. 
Nevertheless, if there is full disclosure to the client, a lawyer 
has the right and professional obligation to exercise reasonable per-
sonal judgment in the interpretation of the law and in the use of 
that interpretation. The right to exercise reasonable personal judg-
ment in the interpretation of the law is necessary to the practice of 
law and thus justified by the affirmative defense. 50 
On the other hand, this right is limited, with the limits set by 
the prevailing professional standard for determining the reasona-
bleness of arguments and claims. For example, it would be unrea-
sonable for the plaintiff's attorney in our example to tell that white 
prospective client that the law does not support a disparate treat-
ment (as opposed to a disparate impact) claim on behalf of a white 
employee. The Supreme Court case of McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co. 51 authoritatively established that Title VII pro-
hibits employers from such disparate treatment discrimination 
against both white and black employees. The attorney's refusal to 
present such a claim on such a basis would be unreasonable and not 
permitted. On the other hand, the employer might claim that its 
admittedly disparate treatment of the white employee was justified 
ory applied when a "nonjob-related barrier . . . has a significant adverse effect on 
minorities or women . ... " Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (emphasis 
added). In the first pension sex discrimination case of Los Angeles Department of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the Court suggested in a footnote that 
an employment practice that had a disparate impact on men might not have the same 
legal consequences as one that had such an impact on women. See id. at 710 n.20. 
Commentators have noted that the issue is unresolved. See III CHARLES A. SULLIVAN 
ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 4.2.2 (2d ed. 1988); Pamela L. Perry, Balanc-
ing Equal Employment Opponunities with Employers' Legitimate Discretion: The Busi-
ness Necessity Response to Disparate Impact Discrimination Under Title VIJ, 12 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 1, 10 n.33 (1990). I have found only one case permitting a white plaintiff to 
bring a race-based disparate impact challenge and the defendant in that case was a 
historically-black university that had been previously found liable for racial discrimina-
tion against whites. See Craig v. Alabama State Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 688 (11th Cir. 
1986). In recognizing the disparate impact claim by the white female plaintiff, the court 
repeatedly said that the claim could be used to remedy discrimination against "minori-
ties," a term which the court used in reference to the plaintiff. Id. at 685, 688. 
50. This right is a defense to the discrimination charge. If the client retains an 
attorney after the disclosure, the right also provides a defense to a malpractice claim. 
51. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
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by a lawful affirmative action plan. 52 Given the uncertainty and dif-
ficulty of the law in this area, the attorney might reasonably decide 
not to challenge the employer's affirmative action, on at least two 
possible grounds. The attorney might believe that the employer's 
plan is legal (although another attorney might assess the same law 
and the same facts and come to a different conclusion). Or the at-
torney might decide that litigation involving a challenge to an af-
firmative action plan is a specialized area of practice, one that the 
attorney is not prepared to engage. The attorney would then ex-
tend the white prospective client an offer of conditional representa-
tion, agreeing to represent him but not to present a disparate 
impact claim or to challenge the employer's affirmative action plan. 
The prospective client would then decide to accept or to reject the 
offer. 
3. The Offer of Conditional Representation 
The affirmative defense based on professional standards thus 
yields the following result: outright rejection-no; reasonable limi-
tations on issues and arguments-yes. The prohibition against dis-
crimination forbids the plaintiff-oriented civil rights attorney from 
rejecting the white or male client because of his race. The attorney 
cannot have a "black-only" or "women-only" criterion for selecting 
clients. However, the lawyer can make an offer of "conditional rep-
resentation," in which representation is conditional upon the client 
accepting the fact that the lawyer will not make certain arguments 
or raise certain claims or defenses. 
This concept. of . "conditional representation" is a necessary 
consequence of a regime that prohibits outright client rejection but 
permits discrimination in issues and arguments. As a concept born 
of compromise, it is an initially unattractive technique, and its de-
fects need to be considered in any evaluation of my suggested ap-
proach. "Conditional representation" is sharply at odds with the 
traditional view of the unconditional, hold-nothing-back commit-
ment entailed in client representation. It sends a mixed message to 
the client: "I'll represent you, but I won't do everything that I law-
fully can to accomplish your goals. I will hold back, because my 
52. As presently permitted (however tenuously) under Title VII by Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193 (1979). The constitutional standard for measuring such plans is now "strict scru-
tiny." See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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personal principles are more important than your case." This is ad-
mittedly not an attractive view of the attorney-client relationship. 
The response to this criticism is confession and avoidance 
rather than denial. Despite its admitted flaws, we should still sup-
port conditional representation because, as Churchill said of de-
mocracy, it is better than the alternatives. 53 One can avoid the 
problem of conditional representation only by adopting an uncondi-
tional rule, one that either permits all or prohibits all discrimina-
tion. Under the traditional rule, permitting all discrimination, the 
attorney's message to the prospective client is clear- "I won't rep-
resent you because you are black"-but the clarity is purchased at a 
high price. The clear message inflicts harm on an innocent individ-
ual and undermines both support for the principle of nondiscrimi-
nation and respect for the legal profession. On the other hand, the 
California rule or the MCAD interpretation prohibiting all discrim-
ination sends a clear but unacceptable message to attorneys: "Your 
thoughts and interpretations don't matter. You are automatons 
whose only job is to advance all plausible claims, regardless of what 
you think about them." This view is equally unacceptable. It em-
bodies an objectionably narrow view of the lawyer's role and would 
invalidate well-established legal practices, traditionally used by or-
ganizations like the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the NOW 
Legal Defense and Education Fund. 
Conditional representation is a necessary consequence of a 
middle view that seeks to accommodate both the prohibition 
against discrimination and a lawyer's legitimate professional auton-
omy. Further, it is unlikely to present a major problem in practice, 
because there will be relatively few offers of conditional representa-
tion and even fewer acceptances.54 If (as may very well have been 
the case with Mr. Stropnicky) the client seeks the attorney precisely 
for the attorney's value in presenting a particular argument or issue, 
and the attorney legitimately refuses to present that argument or 
issue, that client will then likely reject the offer of conditional rep-
resentation. However, it makes sense to keep the power of rejec-
53. "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been 
said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that 
have been tried from time to time." Winston Churchill, House of Commons (Nov. 11, 
1947), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150 (3d ed. 1979). 
54. Once the groundrules become established, it seems likely that few attorneys 
will request, and fewer yet will receive, approval to limit the presentation of issues or 
arguments, and the types of issues and arguments will soon become standardized. Fur-
ther, as discussed in the text, many clients will reject the offer of such representation. 
128 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:103 
tion in the hands of the client, and not the lawyer, because the 
client has the initial information on his or her legal needs and is 
better situated to decide whether this or that attorney can best meet 
those needs. 
B. Discrimination as a Constitutional Right 
The second statutory affirmative defense applies a defense if 
the enforcement of the prohibition against discrimination violates a 
constitutional right. Three related constitutional rights are arguably 
at issue: the right of free expression, the right of association, and 
the right not to be compelled to say what you do not want to say. 
My discussion of these issues will be brief and conclusory, as the 
essay has already grown well beyond its intended scope. 1 conclude 
that the constitutional arguments do not justify outright rejection of 
a client but can help to support and to explain the right of a lawyer 
to exercise reasonable professional judgment in deciding what argu-
ments to make (or not to make) on behalf of a client. 
The first constitutional defense is a straightforward argument 
that the statute impermissibly regulates speech. The statute sub-
jects a lawyer's speech to financial penalty and injunction, based on 
the content of her speech. As an example, Judith Nathanson wants 
to say to Mr. Stropnicky, "I will not represent you because you are 
a man and 1 specialize in representing women," and to her female 
clientele, "I represent only women." The statute's prohibition 
makes both statements untrue,55 and general commercial law pro-
hibits the making of untrue statements. Thus, in combination with 
general commercial law, the statute does in fact abridge her free-
dom of free speech, making it unlawful for Judith Nathanson to say 
what she wants to say. However, this type of abridgement is a stan-
dard feature of most regulatory statutes and does not violate the 
Constitution. 
The second possible constitutional right to discriminate is 
based on the right of association, an aspect of personal autonomy 
and choice which protects the right to chose one's friends, house 
guests and marriage partners, free of most state-imposed con-
straints or requirements. Given the intense and personal nature of 
the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney might claim an analogous 
right to choose the clients with whom to associate, free of statutory 
requirements. However, the attorney-client relationship is more 
55. If the statute applies, she cannot refuse to represent Mr. Stropnicky because 
he is a man, and cannot represent only women. 
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professional than personal, and the attorney's right to choose (both 
to select and to reject) clients is already subject to government reg-
ulation and restraint that would be impossible to impose on purely 
private relationships. Although rarely exercised, courts have the 
right to force an attorney to represent (that is, to associate with) a 
client, even over the attorney's objection. Further, ethical rules 
governing conflicts and prior representation can prevent an attor-
ney from representing (and thus associating with) a client that she 
affirmatively wants to represent. These longstanding limits on the 
lawyer's freedom of association are consistent with the· Supreme 
Court's treatment of associational rights in Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees,56 a case where Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurrence 
that "[a] shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal only with 
persons of one sex."57 An attorney has a constitutional right freely 
to choose her friends, but no constitutional right to choose her cli-
ents (or her law associates or even her law partners).58 
The final constitutional argument is that the operation of the 
statute unconstitutionally compels an attorney to say things that he 
or she does not wish to say, in violation of the attorney's right to 
control his or her own speech (and silence). Skillfully developed by 
Professor Harpaz,59 this argument reinforces the right of lawyers to 
consider race and sex in deciding which arguments to make on be-
half of a client. However, in my view, where the legal profession 
itself has determined that such discrimination violates its profes-
sional standards, it does not support a constitutional right to reject 
clients. 
Rather than review the cases and arguments carefully expli-
cated in Professor Harpaz's essay, I will simply identify what I see 
as the main point of weakness. The argument depends on an anal-
ogy, and the analogy is simply not convincing. The differences be-
tween the activity of a parade director in organizing and presenting 
his parade and the work of an attorney in representing a client are 
profound, and the law should wisely recognize these differences. In 
case law shorthand, for speech purposes, Judith Nathanson is more 
like Ollie McClung, the owner of Ollie's Barbeque,60 than "Wacko" 
56. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
57. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
58. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). 
59. See Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech 
Rights of Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998). 
60. Ollie McClung, Sr. and Ollie McClung, Jr. were the father-and-son owners of 
Ollie's Barbeque, a restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, and the plaintiffs in the law-
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Hurley, a member of the South Boston Allied War Veterans Coun-
cil that organized the parade.61 
First Amendment analysis looks carefully at the context in 
which the regulated speech occurs, both to classify the level of pro-
tection for the speech and to determine the nature and weight of 
the government's interest. A parade is an example of strongly pro-
tected speech, and the First Amendment prevents the government 
from forcing a parade director (the holder of the speech right) to 
include (or exclude) this or that group.62 While he is "performing" 
his parade, the government cannot prevent him from saying what 
he wants to say, cannot tell him what to say and cannot compel him 
to share his parade or speech with others. 
The speech of Ollie the restaurateur and Judith Nathanson the 
lawyer occurs in a different context. In ways that would be impossi-
ble with the parade director, the government can, in certain circum-
stances and for certain purposes, prevent them from saying certain 
things and can also tell them what to say. For example, the govern-
ment can prevent Ollie from telling African-Americans that they 
are not wanted in his restaurant and from using racial slurs when 
taking their orders or serving their food. The government can com-
pel Ollie to speak to black customers, to tell them the "specials" not 
on the menu and to ask them what they would like to order.63 If 
proven that Ollie said to every white patron, "Lovely to have you; 
y'all come back now," and said nothing to blacks, and did so inten-
suit that concluded in the Supreme Court case of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 
(1964). In 1964, they brought an action in the federal district court to enjoin the Attor-
ney General from enforcing, as against their family-owned business, the newly enacted 
Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. § 2000-b (1994) (current codified ver-
sion). In a per curiam decision, a three-judge court granted the injunction. See Mc-
Clung v. Katzenbach, 233 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ala. 1964). That court noted as 
"undisputed facts," id. at 817, that Ollie's Barbeque served meals in a "wholesome at-
mosphere," id. at 825 n.3, to "white collar business people and family groups," id., and 
primarily to "regular customers who are for the most part known to the plaintiffs." Id. 
The McClungs "would not voluntarily serve meals to Negroes." Id. 
61. "Wacko" Hurley is John J. Hurley, the only individual plaintiff identified in 
the Supreme Court opinion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
62. The unanimous Supreme Court opinion goes out of its way to emphasize the 
classic speech context of the case. The opinion begins by describing the issue as 
"whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a parade to include 
among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to con-
vey." Id. at 559. The court then takes two pages to describe the 20,000 marchers that 
often participate in, and the 1 million viewers that often watch, the parade. See id. at 
560-62. 
63. Prohibiting and imposing monetary penalties on this form of disparate treat-
ment would constitute government compulsion. 
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tionally to discriminate against blacks, the government could com-
pel Ollie to say "Lovely to have you ... " to black patrons as well. 
For purposes of analyzing the constitutional basis of a claimed 
right to discriminate against clients, attorney speech in the context 
of representing a client in the practice of law is closer to Ollie's 
speech than to the parade director's. While a lawyer is obviously 
different than a restaurateur or shopkeeper, the professional con-
duct and speech of a lawyer can be and is extensively regulated, in a 
way that the parade director's speech can not be and is not. As the 
press conference64 and solicitation cases65 and long-established lim-
itations on attorney vouching66 demonstrate, the government can 
directly prevent the attorney from saying some things that she 
wants to say. Further, the government can sometimes force an at-
torney to say things that she does not want to say67 and to represent 
clients that she does not want to represent.68 
The right to protection from compelled speech depends on a 
strong right-like the parade director's-to control one's speech. 
An attorney has that right in her role as a citizen, organizing a 
parade or giving a speech, but not in the practice of law governed 
by the reasonable professional standards of the legal profession.69 
64. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
65. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). But see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) 
(lawyer advertising that is not false or misleading is commercial speech protected by the 
FIrst Amendment). 
66. Notwithstanding the desire of the attorney and her client, an attorney is 
prohibited from "vouching" her belief in her client's position. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDver Rule 3.4(e) (1994); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIDILITY DR 7-106(C)(3) (1994); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 26, at 624. Thus, the 
government can prevent the attorney from saying, "I believe from the bottom of my 
heart that my client is telling the truth and that she is innocent." 
67. See, e.g., Zuaderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (up-
holding requirement that attorneys advertising that they accepted cases on contingency 
disclose that clients might still be liable for substantial costs). 
68. A court can require an attorney to represent a client, over the attorney's ob-
jection. Also, in litigation, an attorney must receive the court's permission in order to 
withdraw from representation. If that permission is denied, the court can require the 
attorney to continue representing a client and, in that context, speak on behalf of the 
client. 
69. I do not develop the implications of the continuum of speech that ranges from 
speech in the lawyer's office to speech in the courtroom or speech on behalf of a client 
in other public contexts. These distinctions strike me as considerably less important 
than the distinction between the roles and activities of the lawyer and the parade 
director. 
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IV. ApPLYING THE STATUTE 
This section will apply the statute to the conduct of the six at-
torneys and conclude that the conduct of Lawyer 3 is lawful and 
that the statute bars the conduct of Lawyers 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. The 
results for all but Lawyer 4 follow from the straightforward applica-
tion of the general principles of interpretation developed in Section 
III. The case of Lawyer 4 raises the additional issue of how to treat 
conduct based on deeply held views, where such views cannot be 
justified as reasonable professional judgments but are permissible 
personal opinions based on religious or moral beliefs. 
Lawyer 1 and Lawyer 2 are both white lawyers who refuse to 
represent African-Americans because of a personal dislike of, and 
desire not to associate with, black people. Both claim that "strong 
personal feelings" of dislike of African-Americans would prevent 
him from proving the zealous representation required by the pro-
fessional standards. The only difference is their method of opera-
tion: Lawyer 1 is honest and overt about his discrimination; Lawyer 
2 is covert. 
Lawyer 1 will comply with § l(C) of the statute and seek an 
affirmative defense and the agency will deny his request. While 
strong racist "personal feelings" were grounds for refusing to repre-
sent a client under the prior law, they no longer suffice, as rejecting 
the traditional view was the major point of the legislation. Lawyer 
1 has no valid constitutional claims. He still has the right to speak 
and freely to choose his dinner guests and golf partners.70 
Lawyer 2 is unlikely to request permission to discrimination 
from the Board of Bar Overseers. Rejected clients will not know 
that the reason for the rejection was racial or sexual and are un-
likely to file a discrimination complaint. Even if they do, the com-
plaint will be investigated and adjudicated under the difficult 
Burdine standard71 and, as in employment cases, the clients will 
often lose. The example of Lawyer 2 reflects two unhappy facts of 
life that the statute is powerless to change: 1) that covert discrimi-
nation is difficult to detect and eliminate; and 2) that people (even 
lawyers) who lie sometimes get away with it. 
While this example exposes a limitation on the statute's likely 
effectiveness and enforceability, it is not, in my view, a reason for 
70. Although, after Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), he may not 
choose his law partners as freely, at least in most circumstances. 
71. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). See 
generally LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 48, at 11-39. 
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rejecting the statute. Even if it did not change any behavior but 
instead drove all existing discrimination underground, the statute 
would still perform the worthwhile function of sending one impor-
tant message and retracting another. It sends the important social 
message that discrimination is unlawful. It retracts the prior 
message that lawyers can discriminate, even though virtually no one 
else can. That message was harmful to the moral authority and im-
age of the legal profession and undermined the societal commit-
ment to eradicating discrimination; it is important to reject that 
message. 
Lawyer 3 extends to male prospective clients an offer of condi-
tional representation. While she will represent them, she will in-
quire carefully into the facts of a male homemaker's role and work 
(and will not simply assume that an actual-as opposed to formal-
equivalence with the role and work of a female homemaker). Fur-
ther, she will not make the "plus factor" argument on behalf of a 
male client. Lawyer 3 satisfies both affirmative defenses and will be 
granted a conditional right to discriminate, not in representation 
but in argumentation. As a matter of professional standards, a law-
yer must have a reasonable amount of professional freedom to in-
terpret the law and form opinions about which arguments to use in 
particular cases. Given the Supreme Court decision in Kahn v. 
Shevin,72 recognizing the legality of treating men and women differ-
ently in some contexts on the basis of social conditions,73 Lawyer 
3's interpretation is a reasonable and defensible one, although by 
no means necessary or inevitable. It would be perfectly legitimate 
for a lawyer down the street to reject this interpretation and to ar-
gue that a "plus-factor" for females is illegal and that male and fe-
male homemakers should (as a matter of policy) and must (as a 
matter of law) be treated alike. The law is presently somewhat 
open-ended in this area and a lawyer should have the freedom to 
interpret the law either way and to reject an interpretation with 
which she disagrees. 
However, this freedom is not limitless, and the standards of 
reasonable legal interpretation set the limits. The reasonableness 
of Lawyer 3's interpretation of the "plus factor" argument is contin-
72. 416 u.S. 351 (1974). 
73. Kahn upheld a statute permitting a property tax exemption for widows but 
not widowers. See id. at 351; see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per 
curiam) (upholding Social Security benefit formula that treated women more favorably 
than men); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (5-4 decision) (upholding differ-
ent treatment of men and women in military discharge policy). 
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gent on the state of "the law" at the time of the interpretation. If 
the Supreme Court should reverse Kahn or similar cases using suit-
ably broad language,74 Lawyer 3's argument might very well be-
come an unreasonable legal interpretation, more like Lawyer 4's 
view on inter-racial marriage. The boundaries of permissible law-
yer discrimination are established by the professional standards 
governing the lawyer's role. 
Lawyer 4 presents an interesting variation. Because he objects 
to inter-racial marriages, as a matter of personal principle (notwith-
standing the fact that such marriages are legal and constitutionally 
protected75), he will not represent a client, whether black or white, 
who seeks legal representation concerning a prenuptial agreement 
for an inter-racial marriage, although he will represent a white or 
black person concerning a prenuptial agreement for a same-race 
marriage. Under conventional discrimination analysis, his refusal 
to represent a black or white client in these circumstances consti-
tutes racial discrimination.76 
Unlike Lawyer 3, Lawyer 4 cannot justify his conduct as an 
exercise of his professional responsibility to interpret the law and 
decide which legal arguments to make. His position that prenuptial 
agreements attached to inter-racial marriages are invalid is com-
pletely wrong as a matter of law. If presented in court, it would be 
rejected and would be grounds for a Rule 11 sanction. Therefore, 
while Lawyer 4 is certainly free as a citizen to criticize inter-racial 
marriages, he can hardly claim that such arguments are necessary to 
or even permissible in the practice of law. Once again, we see that 
there is limit to professionally-supported lawyer freedom to inter-
pret the law, that the standards of reasonable legal interpretation 
establish that limit, and that Lawyer 4 has exceeded it. 
74. Such a reversal is not an idle possibility. The Kahn decision itself was 5-4. 
Three years later, Justice Stevens indicated that he might vote to overrule Kahn, which 
was decided before he joined the court. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Goldfarb, the Court, on a 5-4 vote, invalidated a 
Social Security provision that treated widows and widowers differently in terms of set-
ting eligibility for survivor benefits. 
75. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 u.S. 1 (1967). 
76. Lawyer 4 may argue that· his refusal to represent a client in such circum-
stances is not racial discrimination, because it is based not on the race of the potential 
client but on the race of the person that his potential client plans to marry. However, 
under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in an analogous situation (discrimination 
based not on the sex of the employee but on the sex of the employee's spouse), the 
Supreme Court ruled that such one-step-removed discrimination was still unlawful dis-
crimination. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 
684 (1983). 
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On the other hand, the hypothetical asks us to assume that 
Lawyer 4 feels deeply about this issue and objects to any personal 
involvement in such marriages on moral grounds. Let us further 
assume that his objection is as strongly felt as that of the doctor 
who objects to performing an abortion on moral or religious 
grounds. For this doctor, not as an interpretation of professional 
standards but through specific statutes, Congress and state legisla-
tures have authorized the refusal to follow professional standards in 
certain circumstances.77 As a matter of professional standards 
alone, the doctor would be required to provide an abortion, if medi-
cally indicated after consultation with the patient. However, 
notwithstanding these professional standards and the patient's 
(Roe-based but McRae-limited) constitutional right,78 society has 
provided a special exemption for the doctor who objects on moral 
or religious grounds to a procedure that is required as a matter of 
professional standards .. If the doctor is allowed to act on the basis 
of his strongly felt objections, will Lawyer 4 and, for that matter, 
Ollie, who also objects strongly on moral grounds to having Mri-
can-Americans in his restaurant, be offered similar protection? The 
answer is: maybe, if the legislature offers it. The doctor's protection 
was a matter of legislative grace,· not professiomil standards, and 
Lawyer 4 and Ollie will get relief only if the legislature provides it. 
The legislature has already refused to grant Ollie relief, and for 
good reason. The legislature assigned Ollie's objection a very low 
value and further concluded that protecting Ollie's interest would 
seriously hinder the enforcement of discrimination law. It would 
authorize a "racist's veto" that would empower and validate resist-
ance. I would expect that Lawyer 4's request would also be 
rejected. 
Lawyer 5 is Judith Nathanson. As I have indicated earlier, it is 
unlikely that she can establish an affirmative defense for client re-
jection. An examination of her stated reasons reveals their inade-
77. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 3000a-7(a) (1994) (no individual is required to perform 
or participate in abortion if contrary to her religious beliefs or moral convictions); 
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 121 (1997) (statutory authorization to refuse to perform 
abortions if an objection on religious or moral grounds is stated in writing; also authori-
zation to nurses, social workers and psychologists to refuse to give counseling with re-
spect to abortions). 
78. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
While Roe and its progeny establish a right to be free of unreasonable government 
regulation in obtaining an abortion, McRae established that the right was a negative 
right to be free from unreasonable government regulation and not a positive right to be 
entitled to government support. 
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quacy. A desire "to devote her expertise to eliminating gender bias 
in the court system" identifies an acceptable and commendable end 
but does not justify the discriminatory means employed to achieve 
it. The desire "to feel a commitment to her client's cause ... that in 
family law she has only experienced ... in representing women" is 
the "strong personal feelings" rationale that was examined and 
found wanting in Section III-A. A statement that her practice fo-
cuses on "the issues that arise in representing wives in divorce pro-
ceedings" describes an acceptable area of specialization but does 
not begin to address-let alone explain-why such specialization 
requires the rejection of men whose cases involve the same issues. 
Professor Miller suggests another reason-to enhance "'her credi-
bility with judges"'79-that seems to me to trade unacceptably on 
both gender stereotyping and vouching. 
On the other hand, Judith Nathanson may be like Lawyer 3. 
Although not fully developed in the record, one reading of the Na-
thanson-Stropnicky interaction is that Mr. Stropnicky wanted to re-
tain Judith Nathanson because he had strategically determined that 
she, as a female attorney making the argument that worked so ef-
fectively for female homemakers, could most persuasively make the 
male homemaker argument on his behalf and that she rejected him 
precisely because she refused to make the same argument for him 
as she would for a female homemaker. In this view, he wanted to 
enlist her and her representation to do exactly what she legitimately 
did not want to do. If that is the case, then she is like Lawyer 3 and 
can and should explain the restrictions on her advocacy to Mr. 
Stropnicky and allow him to decide if he wants the conditional rep-
resentation that she is willing (or, should I say, required) to offer 
him. 
Lawyer 6 is a combination of Lawyer 3 and Judith Nathanson. 
Like Judith Nathanson, he cannot justify the outright rejection of 
female clients. Specialization does not justify such discrimination, 
and his male clients have no right to a "pure" lawyer, one who rep-
resents only men. Unlike Lawyer 3 (and like Lawyer 4), his per-
sonal and political beliefs go beyond the bounds of reasonable 
interpretation. However, if Lawyer 6 limited his family law practice 
to representing only the wealthier party, or the highest income 
79. Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities, Client Selection and the Antidiscrimina-
tion Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 93, 95 (1998) (citation omitted). 
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wage-earner, he presumably could accomplish many of his goals 
without impermissibly discriminating because of sex. 
V. A POSSIBLE ApPROACH TO THE STROPNICKY ApPEAL 
Judith Nathanson has appealed the Single Commissioner's de-
cision in the Stropnicky case to the Full Commission of the Massa-
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination, where the matter is 
currently under review.80 The Full Commission might consider the 
approach suggested in this essay when it interprets the Massachu-
setts Public Accommodation Statute. While the text of the law 
does not contain any affirmative defenses,81 as a matter of statutory 
construction and based on its expertise and experience, the Com-
mission could well determine that the purposes of the statute would 
be best served by recognizing the two suggested affirmative de-
fenses. If the Commission recognized that affirmative defenses 
were part of the proper interpretation of the statute, it would then 
be wise to remand the case for further proceedings, to determine 
whether Judith Nathanson qualifies for either of the affirmative de-
fenses. It is likely that, upon remand, the Single Commissioner 
would want to hear further testimony and argument on the many 
factual and policy issues in the context of the particular case. It is 
also possible that the Single Commissioner would want to use the 
flexible powers granted the administrative agency and invite partici-
pation (in some form-as amicus curiae or as intervenors) from the 
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and from bar groups (in-
cluding the Massachusetts Bar Association, the Women's Bar Asso-
ciation and others) and civil rights and civic and professional 
organizations. 
A hearing on remand might provide a more comprehensive 
and public engagement of the issues than was possible at the initial 
hearing. By considering these issues within a familiar framework 
that is clearly established in advance of the hearing, the Single 
Commissioner and the Full Commission are likely to receive 
stronger, more focused presentations from the parties and possible 
intervenors and amici. This suggestion-a recognition of affirma-
tive defenses and a remand for further proceedings-does not guar-
antee any particular result. It does, however, provide some 
80. Review to the Full Commission is provided by MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, 
§ 3(6) (1997). Information about the pending appeal was obtained through a telephone 
interview with Jerrold Levinsky, Esq., Acting General Counsel, MCAD (Feb. 23, 1998). 
81. The statute was originally enacted in 1865. See supra note 20. 
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assurance that the issues will be joined and adjudicated in a context 
conducive to a reflective and fully-considered resolution. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of lawyer discrimination brings new perspectives to 
traditional topics like the practice of law, the role of the lawyer and 
the relationship with, and rights of, the client. It forces us to ex-
amine the nature of lawyer discretion, the limits of that discretion 
and the consequences of trying to regulate that discretion. The ex-
amination is a daunting task. 
This essay offers an approach that attempts to protect both the 
prohibition against discrimination and the practice of law and to 
accommodate the tension that necessarily accompanies this effort. 
It suggests that the best solution is to prohibit lawyers from discrim-
inating in client selection but to permit attorneys to use reasonable 
professional judgment in selecting the issues and arguments that 
they are willing to raise on behalf of a client. It discusses the con-
cept of "conditional representation" inherent in the proposal and 
concludes that the problems associated with this concept are far 
preferable to the problems associated with any other alternative. 
With the new California rule, the requirements of the Ameri-
cans with Disability Act and the recent MCAD decision, this issue 
will be increasingly before courts, legislators, bar associations, civil 
rights agencies and, ultimately, the public. I offer my proposal as a 
contribution to the ongoing debate. 
